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Abstract: Using a sample of UK firms, we investigate whether external audit quality
has an informational role for firms credit score. In our general research setting, we
could not find any evidence on the association between firms’ credit score and
external audit quality. However, when firms are suspected to be engaged in man-
agerial misstatements, firms’ credit score seems to be associated with external
audit quality. In particular, suspected firms get high credit score when they are
audited by one of industry-specialised auditors. In addition, credit rating agencies
penalise suspect firms when they pay high audit and non-audit fees.
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1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether the choice of auditor impacts the credit score
assigned to an entity. In contrast to the majority of accounting studies focusing on the equity
market and investors perception about audit quality, we focus on debt market for many reasons as
summarised by Wu and Zhang (2014). Firstly, debt is considered as one of the important external
sources of finance available to public companies. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
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and Vishny (1998) show that public and private debts represent 59% of gross national product
while equity finance represents, on average, 40%. Therefore, lenders might represent one of the
key users of firms’ reported information and therefore might be concerned about financial infor-
mation quality and accuracy. It worth investigating the debt market perception about the per-
ceived quality of external auditors. In particular, in our paper, we focus on credit rating for many
reasons. As noted by Frost (2007), Zalata and Roberts (2017), credit rating agencies are considered
as one of the key players in the debt market and their ratings play an important role in reviewing
the probability of firms default risk and determining the cost of debt.
One might argue that lenders are more likely to behave as similar as equity investors and
consequently they would require and react similarly to the same information. However, equity
markets and debt markets users often have different information needs (Wu & Zhang, 2014) and
Holthausen and Watts (2001) pointed out that what is considered relevant for one user group, may
not be relevant for others users and advise against focusing exclusively on stock market data as
this does not fully encompass the needs of many other users of financial information. Arguably,
credit ratings agencies are less likely to base their decision on published information to evaluate
firms’ creditworthiness. This can be associated with having an information advantage regarding
firms’ prospects, and thereby they are considered more sophisticated users and less likely to rely
on reported information to assign a credit score. For example, credit rating agencies have access
to unpublished information such as data on board meeting minutes, internal capital allocation,
and breakdown of profit by product (Ederington & Yawitz, 1987; Jiang, 2008). Therefore, it is an
ongoing empirical question whether credit rating agencies are concerned about perceived audit
quality where determining a suitable credit score. The research on stakeholders’ perception about
audit quality cannot be inclusive without extending this research to other key providers of finance;
the debt market. Consequently, we engage with the debate on the use of credit rating agencies of
firms’ reported information and investigate whether credit rating agencies assign high score for
firms audited by high quality auditors. In addition, we investigate whether credit ratings agencies
are rational in this decision by investigating our research question in a setting where firms are
more likely to have managed their earnings in order to affect stakeholders’ perception about their
underlying performance.
Despite the theoretical expectations that lenders and credit rating agencies would use other
sources of information instead of the publicity available information, the majority of empirical
accounting research suggests that a firm’s credit rating is sensitive to its reported information. For
example, Jiang (2008) shows that credit rating agencies upgrade their ratings for firms reporting
better earrings performance (i.e. meeting/beating their predetermined earnings benchmarks).
Similarly, Wu and Zhang (2014) show that firms credit rating are associated with accounting
default factors for firms that either voluntarily or mandatorily adopt the international financial
reporting standards. In addition, Zalata and Roberts (2017) show that credit rating agencies
reduce their rating for firms engaging in earnings management to avoid reporting core losses.
Therefore, It seems that credit rating agencies consider firms’ published information and assign
higher score for high quality information. In addition, other studies found that lenders are sensitive
to accounting information and performance (e.g. Abrar, 2019; Eliwa, Aboud, & Saleh, 2019; Eliwa,
Gregoriou, & Paterson, 2019).
External auditors play a significant role in ensuring that reported information free from signifi-
cant misstatements (DeAngelo, 1981; Watts & Zimmerman, 1981), and therefore the presence of
a high quality auditor should contribute to the credibility of the reported information, which in turn
should affect different contracts’ terms between the firm and different stakeholders including
credit rating agencies. There is less consensus on whether firms’ choice of auditor plays a crucial
role in setting debts contracts. For example, Dedman and Kausar (2012) show that private firms
who are voluntarily audited obtain a significantly higher credit rating than other firms who are not.
Some other studies went further and focus on the auditor quality. For instance, Mansi, Maxwell,
and Miller (2004) find entities that were audited by “the big four” audit firms received a better
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credit rating and that there is a positive relationship between auditor tenure and credit rating.
However, Fortin and Pittman (2007) did not find evidence that hiring one “the big four” auditors
affected private firms’ credit ratings. However, the majority of these studies have focused on firms
in the USA, which is characterized by high litigation environments in which the auditor would be
more concerned about their reputation and litigation consequences from material misstatements
in the firms’ annual report and therefore credit rating agencies are more likely to value the
auditors’ monitoring role. This might partially explain the contradiction between Mansi et al.
(2004) focusing on public firms and Fortin and Pittman (2007) focusing on private firms.
Arguably, auditors’ reputation and litigation risk is lower when they audit smaller private firms
and it seems that credit rating agencies do not react differentially to such.
Therefore, in order to provide direct answer to this dilemma, we use a sample of public firms
listed in the UK characterized by less litigation concerns from external auditors. For example, in the
UK, there is no regulatory body similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as in the
USA, suggesting that auditor’s litigation may be smaller and therefore credit rating agencies might
response differentially to audit quality in such environment. Previous research noted that while the
litigation in the UK has become more frequent, the litigation and penalties against external
auditors are still tougher in the USA than in the UK (Basioudis, Papakonstantinou, & Geiger,
2008; Seetharaman, Gul, & Lynn, 2002). Previous UK audit studies (i.e. Basioudis & Francis, 2007;
Basioudis et al., 2008; Ezzamel, Gwilliam, & Holland, 1996) suggest that the UK audit market is
sharp contrast to the US counterpart. Therefore, without direct examination, it is not clear whether
credit rating agencies appreciate the participation of a high quality auditor in the UK. In addition,
given the relative dominance of “the big 4” audit firms in the audit market, using the size of audit
firm might lead to less variation between firms, which might affect the statistical power of the
analysis. Therefore, we use other sophisticated proxies for audit quality. In particular, instead of
using the size of the audit firm, we focus on auditors’ industry expertise. In addition, we focus on
the joint provision of non-audit service and finally, we focus on audit effort as measured using
audit fees (AF).
Using a sample of UK firms from 2008 to 2010, we investigate the informational role of external
audit quality to debt mark in the UK. We specially focus on the credit score of UK firms given the
fact this this score will affect the terms of their potential debt contracts (Zalata & Roberts, 2017).
Our robustness analysis does not show any significant relationship between big audit firms and
credit score. However, our main findings suggest that external audit quality does not impact the
credit rating unless the firm has been suspected to be engaged in managerial misstatements. In
particular, in our general research setting, we did not found evidence on the informational role of
audit quality to credit rating agencies. On the other hand, our additional analysis suggests that
suspect firms reporting small positive core earnings per share enjoy a high credit score if they are
audited by one of industry-specialised auditors. Finally, we find that suspect firms paying high
audit and non-audit fees (NAF) are penalised by credit ratings agencies, probably because credit
rating agencies believe that high fees compromise auditors’ independence and therefore these
firms might have reported small core earnings using earnings management.
Our paper contributes to the audit literature by providing the first evidence on informational role
of external audit quality for credit rating agencies by focusing on the UK setting. Extant research,
to large extent, has focused on the USA (i.e. Fortin & Pittman, 2007; Mansi et al., 2004) with less
consideration to the UK, which might raise a concern over their generalizability to other countries.
The UK has been characterised by more flexible legal environment than its USA counterpart, which
enable us to examine how credit rating agencies react to audit quality in such flexible environ-
ment. In addition, unlike Fortin and Pittman (2007), Mansi et al. (2004) focusing on auditors’ size,
we extend extant literature by using more sophisticated proxies for audit quality such as auditors’
industry specialization and audit and Non-Audit Fees. Linking our finding to Fortin and Pittman
(2007) and Mansi et al. (2004), we conclude that the external auditor size does not convey new
information for credit rating agencies and rather it is their characteristics that play a critical role in
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assigning firms credit ratings. Second, our study sheds light on the implication of hiring high quality
auditors for the debt markets. Consequently, our study contributes to the current debate on the
use of published information by lenders and suggests that, at least in the UK, credit rating
appreciation and reaction to external audit quality is more nuanced in firms suspected to have
managed their earnings.
The reminder of our paper is structured as follows; in Section 2, we review existent related
studies and develop our main hypothesis. In Section 3, we discuss our empirical equation, vari-
ables’ measurement and describe our sample. In Section 4, we report and discuss our main
findings and further analysis. In Section 5, we conclude.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) presumes that the capital market responds in an efficient
and unbiased way to all available information, not just accounting information (Deegan &
Unerman, 2006). The underlying assumption of EMH is that the stock prices quickly reflect any
newly released information (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), and consequently, there is a close
relationship between earnings announcement and share prices. There are many accounting
studies that document this relationship such as Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968).
Managers are therefore interested in presenting high earnings performance in order to encourage
investment in their company and to protect their wealth, where they have an interest in the share
price. Failed firms may increase their earnings through earnings management. Several accounting
studies suggest that investors naively fixate on reported earnings and cannot see through earnings
management (Beneish & Vargus, 2002; McVay, 2006; Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001).
Given that investors cannot see through managerial opportunism, other studies assume that
investors might apply simple heuristic rules in order to ascertain the integrity of firms’ reported
information. For example, some studies have assumed that investors might fixate on the choice of
external auditors. Annual report’s users observe only reported earnings and not pre-managed
earnings (Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999). Agency theory suggests that managerial opportunism
can be mitigated by external auditor’s scrutinizing; however, audit efficiency and its ability to deter
against aggressive accounting choices depends on the external auditor quality or the joint prob-
ability of detecting and reporting financial reporting breaches which in turn partially depends on
external auditor independence (DeAngelo, 1981). Independent external auditors are less likely to
accept questionable accounting choices, and are more likely to detect and report errors. Since
audit procedures and auditors’ independence are unobservable to external users, accounting
studies tend to define independence relying on the appearance dimension (Ghosh & Moon,
2005). The most common proxy for external audit quality is audit firm size.
Arguably, large audit firms are more likely to detect material errors and misstatements because
of their observable quality characteristics such as providing specialised training to their staff,
accreditation by some reputable agency and peer reviews (Dopuch & Simunic, 1980 cited in
Teoh & Wong, 1993). Furthermore, impairing auditor independence is a reducing function of the
number of current clients. In particular, DeAngelo (1981) demonstrated analytically that when
auditors discovered breaches, they would compare the present value of quasi-rent lost if they
reported trustfully and were removed, with the present value of quasi-rent from other clients lost if
they did not report and were removed from some or all other clients. That is, an auditor with large
number of auditees will lose much by not reporting discovered breaches. Prior research has
demonstrated that high quality information is associated with big auditors (Becker, DeFond,
Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis et al., 1999)
Given the value that big auditors create, other studies have extensively investigated whether
investors can see this value and therefore reward firms audited by high quality auditor. For
example, Balvers, McDonald, and Miller (1988) and Beatty (1989) suggest that the underpricing
of IPOs is lower in firms audited by big auditors. Similarly, Teoh and Wong (1993) show that firms
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audited by a big auditor, experience high earnings response coefficients. Research also suggests
that firms switching from non-big auditors to big auditors experience a stock market reward
(Eichenseher, Hagigi, & Shields, 1989; Johnson & Lys, 1990; Kluger & Shields, 1991; Nichols &
Smith, 1983). Therefore, it appears that the informational role of the size of external auditors
matters to equity investors. Other studies, albeit limited, have focused on the informational role of
external auditor to the credit rating agencies and in general, as previously explained their findings
are mixed (i.e. Fortin & Pittman, 2007; Mansi et al., 2004). However, one problem in these studies is
that, in general, they have focused on the US firms that, arguably, are operating in strong legal
environment with less evidence in other countries that are arguably less tough. In addition, they
have focused, to large extent on auditor size. However, current research suggests that there are
others factors that might affect the quality of audit; for instance the characteristics of external
auditors such as industry specialist, or the importance of audit and NAF (Fakhfakh Sakka, &
Jarboui, 2016).
Some studies use the industry specialisation as a proxy for audit quality as these types of
auditors would be able to exercise better judgement due to their knowledge and expertise in
such specific industry. In addition, these auditors are more likely to be concerned about their
reputation as expert in such industries, which might motivate them to address technical account-
ing issues in more detail and challenge managers’ financial reporting decisions. Previous research
suggested that industry specialist auditors are associated with better information quality (Balsam,
Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009; Krishnan, 2003). Finally, other studies focus on
other proxies for audit quality such as the provision of non-audit service (Hoang Tien, Thuong, Minh
Duc, & Hoang Yen, 2019). Extant accounting studies suggest that the provision of non-audit
services might impair external auditors’ independence, as they become, to a large extent, finan-
cially dependant of their auditee (Simunic, 1984; Beck, Frecka, & Solomon, 1988; Ferguson, Seow, &
Young, 2004; Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; Lim and Tan, 2007;
Zhang, Hay, & Holm, 2016).
Based on these empirical studies, external auditor quality would play an import role in
mitigating any potential managerial opportunism and will consequently contribute to the
increased credibility of the financial statements. Therefore, we expect that firms retaining a high
quality auditor will be assigned high credit score, which in turn might reduce their future cost of
debt. In particular, we use three proxies for audit quality; namely industry-specialisation, NAF,
and AF.
H1: There is positive association between credit score and high quality auditor.
3. Research design
3.1. Empirical model
In order to investigate whether credit rating agencies give high score to firms retaining high quality
auditor, we employ the following equations;
CRi;t ¼ β0 þ β1 AUDIT Qi;t þ β2 LEVi;t þ β3 SALE Gi;t þ β4 CURRENTi;t þ β5 INST COVi;t þ β6 DACCi;t þ β7 CSi;t
(1)
Where CR is firms credit score for firm i in year t as reported in FAME database. Following Dedman
and Kausar (2012) and Zalata and Roberts (2017), we use Qui Score reported in FAME database as
a proxy for firms’ credit rating. Using publicly available data, Qui Credit Assessment Ltd calculate
the Qui score for each firm and this score takes a value between 0 and 100 where a higher score
demonstrates stronger performance, and a reduced chance of failure during the next 12 months.
AUDIT_Q refers to audit quality and in this paper we use three different proxies for audit quality;
namely industry-specialised auditor (AUD_SPEC), fees paid for non-audit audit service (NAF), and
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fees paid for audit service (AF). AUD_SPEC is an indicator variable set to one if an industry-
specialised auditor audits the firm and zero otherwise. We follow Chung and Kallapur (2003) and
Lim and Tan (2008) and identify the industry-specialised auditor as an auditor who have the
highest number of clients within the industry in year t. If credit rating agencies appreciate hiring
industry-specialised auditor, we expect to find β1 to be positive.
NAF can bemeasured either as a proportion of NAF to the total AF or as the natural logarithmofNAF.
However, two problems are highlighted by Srinidhi and Gul (2007) regarding the proportion of NAF.
Firstly, both the numerator and denominator can affect our dependent variable and therefore the
change of credit score level can be attributed to either numerator or denominator. Secondly, as
demonstrated by Simunic (1984), the increase in NAF can increase the AF, which in turn increases
the denominator. Accordingly and since the Canadian Institute of Charted Accountants and the USA
Public Oversight Board identified the log of NAF as an important measure for assessing the appro-
priateness of external auditor performance of NAF (Ferguson et al., 2004), the natural log of NAF is
used to capture the economic bond arising from non-audit services. If credit rating agencies consider
the joint provision of non-audit service to compromise auditor independence, we should find
a negative relationship between credit rating and NAF. Similar to NAF, we measure AF as the natural
logarithm of AF paid to external auditor. We use AF as a proxy for external auditor effort, where higher
fees represents higher effort exerted by external auditor to improve the integrity of firms financial
reports and therefore we should find a positive relationship between credit rating and AF.
In addition to our main external audit quality variables, we control for firm characteristics that have
been previously shown to affect firm’s credit rating level. In particular, we control firm’s leverage level.
Since firms with lower levels of debt are considered less risky, it is believed that they will not face
difficulties repaying their debt or associated interest. We therefore control for firms’ leverage level
(LEV) and LEV is measured as the proportion of long-term debts to the total capital employed. We
measure total capital employed as the sum of equity and long term debt. Highly liquid firms are less
likely to suffer a shortage in paying its short-term obligations and therefore we control for the current
ratio (CURRENT) measured as the proportion of total current assets to total current liabilities. Firms
achieving sufficient profit to cover their interest expense are less likely to suffer from financial distress
and thus credit rating agencies might reward these firms, with a higher credit rating. Therefore, we
control for interest cover ratio, measured as the proportion of profit before interest and taxes to total
interest expense. Following Kim, Simunic, Stein, and Yi (2011), we control for firms’ sales growth
(SALE_G) measured as the difference between current and last year sales divided by last year sales.
Finally, prior research suggests that credit rating agencies can see through earnings management
(Jiang, 2008; Zalata & Roberts, 2017), and therefore we control for earningsmanagement practices. In
particular, we control for accruals-based earnings management (DACC) and earnings management
using classification shifting (CS). Where DACC is the residual from Jones (1991)model after adjusting it
for earnings and cash flows performance (More details of this model can be found in, example,
Abernathy, Beyer, & Rapley, 2014). CS is an indicator variable set to one if the firm has both abnormal
core earnings and non-recurring expenses; otherwise, we set to zero. Abnormal core earnings are the
residual from an expectation model adopted from McVay (2006). However, we follow Zalata and
Roberts (2017) and eliminate current year accruals from McVay’s (2006) expectation model. We run
these expectation models for each industry-year with at least six observations.
3.2. Sample
A sample of UK firms with available data on DataStream, FAME, and IBES databases over the
period from 2008 and 2010 were analysed. Similar to prior accounting research, we exclude firms
belong to financial services and utilities sectors from our sample. In addition, in order to avoid the
impact of outliers, following Zalata and Roberts (2016), we exclude firms with sales less than
£0.5 million. Furthermore, we exclude firms with missing credit rating data or financial data
required to run equation 1. These procedures lead to a final sample of 1369 firm-year observations
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with complete data over the sample period from 2008 to 2010. We collected different audit quality
data and firms' credit score from FAME database.
4. Findings
4.1. Descriptive statistics
We report descriptive statistics for different variables used in our analysis in Table 1. The average
credit score for our sample is 87 (natural logarithm 4.46) suggesting on average that our sample
are characterised by good financial health. It shows that 36% of our samples are audited by one of
the industry-specialised auditors. We report the Pearson correlation in Table 2 and in general,
there are no potential multicollinearity issues in our analysis.
4.2. Multivariate analysis
Under this analysis, we report our findings of our main research question of whether hiring high
quality auditors would have an impact on firms’ credit score. In particular, we use three proxies for
audit quality; namely, first, industry-specialised auditor (AUD_SPEC) and we expect that hiring an
auditor with relevant sector experience will add to the integrity of firms’ financial statements and
consequently would improve firms’ credit score. Second, NAF and we expect that the joint provision
of NAF might impair auditor independence, which in turn might lead to a reduction in firms credit
score. Finally, AF and we expect that higher AF imply high effort exerted and proportionately lower
levels of materiality being set by external auditors to improve the integrity of firms’ financial
statements which in turn might lead to improving firms’ credit score. However, other studies argue
that high AF might impair auditor independence, and therefore this might negatively affect firms’
credit score. We report the finding of this analysis in Table 3.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Median STD DEV Q1 Q3
CR 4.46 4.51 0.15 4.43 4.53
AUD_SPEC 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
NAF 4.45 4.62 1.97 3.26 5.72
AF 5.26 5.09 1.40 4.2 6.18
LEV 0.23 0.14 0.59 0.00 0.34
SALE_G 0.20 0.08 0.94 −0.05 0.21
CURRENT 1.78 1.39 1.56 0.93 1.97
INST_COV 10.22 4.26 36.12 0.00 13.95
DACC 0.00 0.00 0.06 −0.02 0.02
CS 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Where
CR: Natural logarithm of firms’ credit score as reported in FAME database.
AUD_SPEC: Industry-specialised auditor, which is an indicator variable set to one if the firm is audited by an industry-
specialised auditor and zero otherwise.
NAF: The natural logarithm of non-audit fees.
AF: The natural logarithm of audit fees.
LEV: Firms’ leverage measured as the proportion of long-term debts to the total capital employed.
SALE_G: Sales Growth measured as the difference between current and last year sales divided by last year sales.
CURRENT: Current ratio measured as the proportion of total current assets to total current liabilities.
INST_COV: Interest coverage ratio measured as the proportion of profit before interest and taxes to total interest
expense. To avoid outlier, we cap INST_COV between 100 and −100.
DACC: Discretionary accruals adopted from adjusted expectation model adopted from modified Jones (1991) as
discussed in Abernathy et al. (2014). We require at least 6 industry-year observations to run this model.
CS: Classification shifting measured as indicator variable set to one if the firm has abnormal core earnings and has
non-current expenses. Where abnormal core earning is measured using expectation model adopted from McVay
(2006) and Zalata and Roberts (2017). Similar to DACC, we require at least 6 industry-year observations to run this
model.
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In contrast to our expectation, Table 3 shows an insignificant coefficient on AUD_SPEC and firms
credit score providing no support to our expectation that credit rating agencies perceive the
presence industry-specialised auditor to add the integrity of financial statements and therefore
they do not assign high score to firms audited by industry-specialised auditors. This might suggest
that credit agencies are sophisticated users and have access to other private information and
therefore they seem not to react to the retention of industry-specialised auditor and do not assign
high credit score to firms with these types of auditors.
Similarly, Table 3 shows an insignificant coefficient on NAF and again suggesting that NAF does
not represent relevant information to credit ratings. However, it worth noting that it shows
a positive relationship between NAF and credit rating score, which does not support to our
expectation that NAF impairs external auditor independence, with credit rating agencies penalising
firms paying high NAF fees to their external auditors.
Finally, Table 3 shows insignificant coefficient on AF. However, again, Table 3 shows a negative
relationship between firms’ credit rating score and AF score. This finding does not support our
expectation that auditors who receive higher AF are more likely to be deemed by credit rating
agencies as auditors who have spent more time and effort reviewing the financial statements
detecting material misstatements and instances of earnings management, and thereby constrain
any managerial opportunism. In other words, credit rating agencies might believe that high AF
impair auditor independence and it seems that they moderately penalize firms paying high AF.
4.3. Further analysis
In our main analysis, we did not find evidence that credit ratings agencies seem to appreciate
firms with high quality auditors and assign them high credit score. However, credit rating agencies
may react to audit quality differently in certain settings where the debt providers’ investment in
the firm might be directly affected by the firms’ financial reporting information and choices. One of
these setting is meet/beat earnings benchmarks. Previous research suggests that firms are moti-
vated to avoid reporting an earnings decrease, negative earnings or miss analysts’ forecasts (i.e.
Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Given that market’s participants interpret missing these
targets as a firm might suffer serious problem in their operations which might affect both current
Table 3. Association between credit rating and audit quality
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
AUD_SPEC −0.009 −1.11
NAF 0.000 0.18
AF −0.004 −1.24
LEV −0.013 −1.89* −0.013 −1.94* −0.012 −1.76*
SALE_G 0.000 0.10 0.001 0.14 0.000 0.12
CURRENT −0.001 −0.43 −0.001 −0.43 −0.002 −0.70
INST_COV 0.001 10.53*** 0.001 10.47*** 0.001 10.57***
DACC 0.045 0.67 0.046 0.69 0.043 0.64
CS −0.005 −0.59 −0.005 −0.60 −0.005 −0.56
_CONS 4.451 472.16*** 4.446 342.43*** 4.467 245.85***
Years fixed
effect
YES YES YES
Adj_R2 7.92% 7.92% 7.94%
F 14.08 13.93 14.12
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All variables are as in Table 1.
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and future performance. Thus, market participants might react negatively to such news and
therefore some firms are motivated to avoid these potential negative reactions by manipulating
their earnings in order to meet these predetermined earnings targets.
From the three earnings targets, Jiang (2008) noted that avoiding reporting losses is the most salient
target for debt market for many reasons. First, unlike shareholders who might be affected by both
earnings growth and deterioration, lenders only bear earnings deterioration risk and do not share
earnings growth with shareholders (Fischer & Verrecchia, 1997; Plummer & Tse, 1999). Second, lenders
seem to treat firms’ earrings and loss asymmetrically. Begley and Freedman (2004) indicated that if
a debt contract includes a dividend covenant and the firm has achieved loss, the payment of a dividend
will be reduced by 100% of net losses while, in the case of achieving profit, 50% of profit should be
available for dividends payments. In addition, Beatty,Weber, and Yu (2008) provides anecdotal evidence
that, in the case of lenders using a net worth covenant, covenant slack would be tightened to 100% of
reported loss and, in contrast, it is more likely to be increased if the firms have reported profit. Finally,
Jiang (2008) shows that by avoiding reporting losses, there is a larger impact on a firm’s credit rating,
compared with avoid reporting an earnings decrease or missing analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, it seems
that the debt market is more sensitive to losses than to profit. As such, we expect that credit rating
agencies to be more concerned about firms reported information when a firms report a small positive
core earnings, as these firmsmight have achieved this through earningsmanagement (i.e. Gore, Pope, &
Singh, 2007; Makarem, Hussainey, & Zalata, 2018). Since previous literature has demonstrated that audit
quality plays a critical role in mitigating earnings management practices, we expect that credit rating
agencies to be more concerned and react to external auditors’ quality in firms reporting small positive
core earnings than in other firms. In other words, when a firm report small profit, the presence of high
quality auditor will provide assurance that this small profit is genuine number and is not inflated.
In order to investigate our conjecture, we split our sample into two groups; namely suspect firms
and other firms. In particular, suspect firms are those firms that have reported small IBES earnings
per share between zero and three pence. Consequently, we run equation 1 separately for these two
subsamples and report the finding of this analysis in Tables 4–6. It appears that credit ratings
agencies are more sensitive to audit quality when firms report small positive IBES earnings per
share. In particular, as shown in Table 4, since the participation of an industry-specialised auditor is
associated with high earnings quality, it seems that credit rating agencies only appreciate the
participation industry-specialised auditor when firms are suspected to avoid reporting losses through
the use of earnings management. That is, credit rating agencies seem to perceive firms reporting
small core earrings and have been audited by one of the industry-specialised auditors as a genuine
achiever of their earnings targets (reporting positive core earnings).
Inaddition, sinceNAFhavebeenproven tocompromiseexternal auditors’ independenceand therefore
these auditors are more likely to allow firms’ to mask financial reporting practices, Table 5 shows that
credit rating agencies are rational and penalize firms reporting small positive earnings and pay high NAF
to their external auditors. That is, credit rating agencies seem to perceive firms reporting small core
earrings andhavepaid highNAFas opportunistic achievers of their earnings target.We report AF findings
in Table 6 that shows a significant negative relationship between firms’ credit score, and AF when they
report small IBES earnings per share demonstrating that credit rating agencies consider high AF to
compromise auditor independence. Our analysis using other firms, on average, is qualitatively similar to
our findings reported under the main analysis.
4.4. Robustness analysis
In the previous section, the analysis focused on industry-specialised auditor, NAF and AF received by
external auditors. However, as suggested by prior research, the auditor’s size is another factor thatmight
affect debt market perception. For example, big four auditors are deemed to have a better reputation
comparedwith small auditors (i.e. Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999), and therefore theyhavea lot to
lose if they allow their clients to use opportunistic accounting policies and these opportunism has been
caught be by the regulator. That is, big four auditors are more likely to follow more sophisticated audit
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procedures challenging firms’ financial reporting decisions in order to avoid the negative consequences
of managerial opportunism if discovered. However, our analysis, so far, has not considered, the size of
external auditors and the reasons for this is that the majority of public companies in the UK are more
likely to be audited by one of the big four auditors and therefore using the size of external auditor as
a proxy for audit qualitymight lack statistical power. For example, almost 70% of our sample have been
audited by one of the big four auditors. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that auditor size might be still
perceived by lenders as an important signal for audit quality. In addition, US regulators’ contend that
external audit qualitymight be impaired because of the close relationship between auditee and external
auditor (Gul, Jaggi, & Krishnan, 2007) and therefore it is advisable to rotate the external auditor
periodically in order to exercise a better objective judgement (Brody & Moscove, 1998; Widyaningsih,
Harymawan, Mardijuwono, Ayuningtyas, & Larasati, 2019;Wolf, Tackett, & Claypool, 1999). Therefore, as
a robustness analysis, we use different audit quality proxies, namely big four auditors (BIG4) and long
Table 4. Association between credit rating and audit quality using suspect firms versus other firms
(the case of industry-specialist auditor model)
Variables Suspect firms Other firms
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
AUD_SPEC 0.029 2.04** −0.014 −1.51
LEV −0.068 −4.04*** −0.009 −1.18
SALE_G 0.010 1.02 0.000 0.05
CURRENT 0.002 0.27 −0.001 −0.43
INST_COV 0.001 3.06*** 0.001 9.98***
DACC 0.000 0.00 0.070 0.89
CS −0.013 −0.97 −0.002 −0.22
_CONS 4.457 236.50*** 4.450 427.86***
Years fixed effect YES YES
Adj_R2 15.51% 8.04%
F 4.81 12.47
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
Table 5. Association between credit rating and audit quality using suspect firms versus other
firms (the case of non-audit fee model)
Variables Suspect firms Other firms
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
NAF −0.007 −1.98** 0.002 0.97
LEV −0.066 −3.89*** −0.010 −1.31
SALE_G 0.011 1.06 0.001 0.12
CURRENT 0.001 0.09 −0.001 −0.34
INST_COV 0.001 2.81*** 0.001 9.83***
DACC −0.027 −0.28 0.069 0.88
CS −0.016 −1.15 −0.003 −0.28
_CONS 4.493 188.20*** 4.434 302.49***
Years fixed effect YES YES
Adj_R2 15.40% 7.94%
F 4.87 12.31
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
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auditor tenure. Using the full sample, as reported in Table 7, we find insignificant relationship between
credit score and both big four auditors and auditors with long tenure.
Finally, arguably credit score is sticky and may not reflect the changes in firms audit quality.
Therefore, one might argue that the change in credit score is more suitable measure. As
a robustness analysis, we use the change in firms’ credit score measured as current year minus
last year credit score scaled by last year credit score. Using this measure, our unreported results
show insignificant relationship between firms’ credit score change and industry-specialised
Table 6. Association between credit rating and audit quality using suspect firms versus other
firms (the case of audit fee model)
Variables Suspect firms Other firms
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
AF −0.019 −2.98*** −0.001 −0.30
LEV −0.060 −3.56*** −0.009 −1.20
SALE_G 0.006 0.64 0.000 0.11
CURRENT −0.001 −0.16 −0.001 −0.52
INST_COV 0.001 2.88*** 0.001 9.91***
DACC −0.031 −0.32 0.069 0.88
CS −0.021 −1.52 −0.002 −0.23
_CONS 4.556 126.55*** 4.450 216.04***
Years fixed effect YES YES
Adj_R2 17.65% 7.87%
F 5.45 12.2
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All variables are as defined in Table 1
Table 7. Association between credit rating and audit quality (Big 4 auditors and long tenure
auditors)
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
BIG4 −0.004 −0.51
AUD_TENURE 0.014 1.38
LEV −0.013 −1.86* −0.013 −1.96*
SALE_G 0.001 0.14 0.001 0.20
CURRENT −0.001 −0.49 −0.001 −0.38
INST_COV 0.001 10.50*** 0.001 10.41***
DACC 0.043 0.64 0.046 0.69
CS −0.005 −0.61 −0.005 −0.57
_CONS 4.451 413.78*** 4.447 495.08***
Years fixed effect YES YES
Adj_R2 0.0786 0.0797
F 13.96 14.16
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
BIG4: Indicator variable set to one if the firm is audited by one of big 4 auditor and zero otherwise.
AUD_TENURE: Indicator variable set to one if the auditor tenure is more than 8 year and zero otherwise.
All other variables are as defined in Table 1.
Zalata et al., Cogent Business & Management (2020), 7: 1724063
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2020.1724063
Page 12 of 16
auditors and NAF. However, this might be because of using short sample period and future studies
might use a longer period to reinvestigate our research question.
5. Conclusion
The informational role of external audit quality in the debt market is characterised by less
consensus in prior accounting literature. In addition, the current studies on credit rating and
audit quality have focused on the US firms operating in an ever growing legal environment
and additional financial reporting requirements imposed by regulators. Therefore, in such
environment, it is reasonable to expect that external auditors will exercise superior profes-
sional judgement and consequently the debt market might appreciate and react to the
participation of high quality auditor in such environment. It is not clear whether such findings
can be extended to other countries characterised by moderate litigation environment such as
the UK. Prior research noted that while the litigation environment in the UK is stringent, the
litigation punishments against external auditors are still tougher in the USA than in the UK
(Basioudis et al., 2008; Seetharaman et al., 2002). Already, prior UK audit studies (i.e.
Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Basioudis et al., 2008; Ezzamel et al., 1996) suggest that audit
market in the UK significantly different to the US market. Therefore, without direct examina-
tion, it is not clear whether credit rating agencies appreciate the participation of high quality
auditor in the U.K.
In addition, the majority of US studies have focused on the external auditor’s size and disre-
garded the individual differences between audit firms such as their specific industry experience,
and their time and effort spent in auditing client financial statements. Therefore, in our study, we
have used other proxies for audit quality; namely industry-specialised auditor, joint provision of
non-audit services and the level of AF.
Using a sample of public UK firms over the period between 2008 and 2010, we investigate
whether the debt market really appreciate the participation of high quality auditor. Despite the
fact that credit agencies are sophisticated users and have access to private information, we
found evidence that credit rating agencies reward firms audited by high quality auditors
especially in a setting characterised by high probability of firms have committed opportunistic
financial reporting decisions. In particular, we found credit rating agencies assign high credit
score to firms where the auditor is considered to be an industry specialist especially when
these firms are suspected to be engaged in earnings management. In addition, we found that
firms who paid higher audit and NAF were assigned lower credit score especially when they
report small positive core earnings, which demonstrates that credit rating firms may be con-
cerned that these firms have manipulated their earnings in order to avoid reporting losses and
therefore report positive earnings.
Nevertheless, our findings might be subject to the impact of the global finical crisis. In particular,
our sample covers the 2008–2010 period and it is not clear whether these findings can be
extended to other periods. Future studies might use long period and investigate whether credit
rating agencies response to audit quality is different in other period.
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